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xorshammer.com | ||
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billwadge.com
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| | | | | The famous mathematician Kurt Gödel proved two "incompleteness" theorems. This is their story. By the 1930s logicians, especially Tarski, had figured out the semantics of predicate logic. Tarski described what exactly was an 'interpretation' and what it meant for a formula to be true in an interpretation. Briefly, an interpretation is a nonempty set (the... | |
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unstableontology.com
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| | | | | (note: one may find the embedded LaTeX more readable on LessWrong) The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem implies, among other things, that any first-order theory whose symbols are countable, and which has an infinite model, has a countably infinite model. This means that, in attempting to refer to uncountably infinite structures (such as in set theory), one "may... | |
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jdh.hamkins.org
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| | | | | I'd like to share a simple proof I've discovered recently of a surprising fact: there is a universal algorithm, capable of computing any given function! Wait, what? What on earth do I ... | |
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www.umsu.de
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| | | [AI summary] The discussion centers on the interpretation of higher-order logic and the role of metaphysical domains. Andrew Bacon argues that higher-order logic doesn't require a metaphysical commitment to domains of objects, properties, or propositions. Instead, he emphasizes the use of stipulative definitions and logical connections between sentences to interpret expressions. He contrasts this with the idea that models must be interpreted in a way that reflects a metaphysical structure of reality. The conversation also touches on the nature of provability operators and their relationship to logical frameworks, highlighting the distinction between formal languages and their interpretations in different contexts. | ||
