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blog.sigfpe.com | ||
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billwadge.com
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| | | | | The famous mathematician Kurt Gödel proved two "incompleteness" theorems. This is their story. By the 1930s logicians, especially Tarski, had figured out the semantics of predicate logic. Tarski described what exactly was an 'interpretation' and what it meant for a formula to be true in an interpretation. Briefly, an interpretation is a nonempty set (the... | |
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xorshammer.com
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| | | | | Let $latex \mathrm{PA}$ be Peano Arithmetic. Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem says that no consistent theory $latex T$ extending $latex \mathrm{PA}$ can prove its own consistency. (I'll write $latex \mathrm{Con}(T)$ for the statement asserting $latex T$'s consistency; more on this later.) In particular, $latex \mathrm{PA} + \mathrm{Con}(\mathrm{PA})$ is stronger than $latex \mathrm{PA}$. But certainly, given that... | |
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carcinisation.com
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| | | | | Gödel's theorems say something important about the limits of mathematical proof. Proofs in mathematics are (among other things) arguments. A typical mathematical argument may not be "inside" the universe it's saying something about. The Pythagorean theorem is a statement about the geometry of triangles, but it's hard to make a proof of it using nothing... | |
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thetexasorator.com
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| | | An interview with UT computer scientist and OpenAI researcher Scott Aaronson. | ||