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blog.computationalcomplexity.org | ||
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www.umsu.de
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| | | | | [AI summary] The discussion centers on the interpretation of higher-order logic and the role of metaphysical domains. Andrew Bacon argues that higher-order logic doesn't require a metaphysical commitment to domains of objects, properties, or propositions. Instead, he emphasizes the use of stipulative definitions and logical connections between sentences to interpret expressions. He contrasts this with the idea that models must be interpreted in a way that reflects a metaphysical structure of reality. The conversation also touches on the nature of provability operators and their relationship to logical frameworks, highlighting the distinction between formal languages and their interpretations in different contexts. | |
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math.andrej.com
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ianwrightsite.wordpress.com
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| | | | | Are Cantor's higher infinities really real? | |
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www.jeremykun.com
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| | | Last time we worked through some basic examples of universal properties, specifically singling out quotients, products, and coproducts. There are many many more universal properties that we will mention as we encounter them, but there is one crucial topic in category theory that we have only hinted at: functoriality. As we've repeatedly stressed, the meat of category theory is in the morphisms. One natural question one might ask is, what notion of morphism is there between categories themselves? | ||
