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ridiculousfish.com | ||
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www.bearssl.org
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danlark.org
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| | | | | When it comes to hashing, sometimes 64 bit is not enough, for example, because of birthday paradox -- the hacker can iterate through random $latex 2^{32}$ entities and it can be proven that with some constant probability they will find a collision, i.e. two different objects will have the same hash. $latex 2^{32}$ is around... | |
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mark.engineer
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rot256.dev
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| | | Introduction In this post we will take a look at the Fast Reed-Solomon IOP (FRI) proximity test, which enables an untrusted prover to convince a verifier that a committed vector is close to a Reed-Solomon codeword with communication only poly-logarithmic in the dimension of the code. This is readily used to construct practically efficient zkSNARKs from just cryptographic hash functions (rather random oracles), without the need for a trusted setup. | ||
