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www.mattblaze.org | ||
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www.schneier.com
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| | | | | Interesting analysis: An Internet Voting System Fatally Flawed in Creative New Ways. Abstract: The recently published "MERGE" protocol is designed to be used in the prototype CAC-vote system. The voting kiosk and protocol transmit votes over the internet and then transmit voter-verifiable paper ballots through the mail. In the MERGE protocol, the votes transmitted over the internet are used to tabulate the results and determine the winners, but audits and recounts use the paper ballots that arrive in time. The enunciated motivation for the protocol is to allow (electronic) votes from overseas military voters to be included in preliminary results before a (paper) ballot is received from the voter. MERGE contains interesting ideas that are not inherently unsou... | |
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blog.citp.princeton.edu
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| | | | | Over 9000 jurisdictions (counties and states) in the U.S. run elections with a variety of voting machines: optical scanners for paper ballots, and direct-recording "touchscreen" machines. Which ones of them can be hacked to make them cheat, to transfer votes from one candidate to another? The answer: all of them. An attacker with physical access [...] | |
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rcoh.me
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| | | | | Given the level of distrust in election systems in recent years, I became curious about verifiable voting systems - systems in which you can ensure that your vote was really counted, and counted correctly. Systems in which everyone (or at least interested parties) can verify that election results precisely reflect the votes cast. The verifiable voting system I'll describe is pretty close to "regular" voting for voters. They don't need to care the election is e2e verified, they just need to vote like normal. | |
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jan.schnasse.org
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| | | [AI summary] The page contains only technical cookie consent notices and website navigation elements without any actual article content. | ||
