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theoreticalecology.wordpress.com | ||
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errorstatistics.com
Some have asked me why I haven't blogged on the recent follow-up to the ASA Statement on P-Values and Statistical Significance (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016)-hereafter, ASA I. They're referring to the editorial by Wasserstein, R., Schirm, A. and Lazar, N. (2019)-hereafter, ASA II(note)-opening a special on-line issue of over 40 contributions responding to the call... |
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summerseminarphilstat.com
A key recognition among those who write on the statistical crisis in science is that the pressure to publish attention-getting articles can incentivize researchers to produce eye-catching but inadequately scrutinized claims. We may see much the same sensationalism in broadcasting metastatistical research, especially if it takes the form of scapegoating or banning statistical significance. A... |
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alexanderetz.com
[This post has been updated and turned into a paper to be published in AMPPS] Much of the discussion in psychology surrounding Bayesian inference focuses on priors. Should we embrace priors, or should we be skeptical? When are Bayesian methods sensitive to specification of the prior, and when do the data effectively overwhelm it? Should... |
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dustintran.com
One aspect I always enjoy about machine learning is that questions often go back to the basics. The field essentially goes into an existential crisis every dozen years-rethinking our tools and asking foundational questions such as "why neural networks" or "why generative models".1 This was a theme in my conversations during NIPS 2016 last week, where a frequent topic was on the advantages of a Bayesian perspective to machine learning. Not surprisingly, this appeared as a big discussion point during the p... |
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