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www.jamf.com | ||
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objective-see.org
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| | | | | [AI summary] An analysis of a pirated UltraEdit macOS application containing malicious dynamic libraries that download and execute remote malware payloads including a Khepri agent and a persistent launch agent. | |
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blog.quarkslab.com
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| | | | | The following article explains how during a Purple Team engagement we were able to identify a vulnerability in Microsoft Teams on macOS allowing us to access a user's camera and microphone. | |
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theevilbit.github.io
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| | | | | TL;DR Link to heading On macOS Mojave Gatekeeper only verifies executables, which are run with the open command or the user double clicks. It won't verify files, that are executed through other means like, directly executing a binary ./myapp regardless of the quarantine attribute. If you can place a plist file inside LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons, the command inside will also be executed. Prior to Catalina there is a way to trick users to drag & drop files in the LaunchAgents folder. On macOS Catalina lot has changed, the most notable one regarding gatekeeper is that it will verify files when executed via classic 'exec' methods. | |
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blog.hobbyistsoftware.com
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| | | [AI summary] A developer shares a tutorial on how to access related Objective-C header files from an app's info.plist in the Mac sandbox using a custom FilePresenter and NSFileCoordinator. | ||
