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alice.climent-pommeret.red | ||
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redops.at
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theevilbit.github.io
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| | | | | In the recent days I was reading technical analysis of win32k exploits from recent years, and it caught my eyes, that the HMValidateHandle technique is very heavily used almost everywhere. Then I had an idea how to protect against this family of exploits, which I think is very simple. This post will be about that. What is HMValidateHandle? Link to heading HMValidateHandle is an internal, unexported function of user32.dll. It takes a handle and a handle type as arguments, and by looking up the handle table, if the handle is matching with the type it will copy the object to user memory. If the object contains a pointer to itself, like tagWND it can be used to leak memory addresses from the kernel. This has been a known technique for very long time, I think the... | |
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oldboy21.github.io
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| | | | | Ciao World, since I can't get enough of playing around with the Reflective DLL that inspired the very first blog during the Christmas Holiday, after the YOLO Loader I decided to grant the little nasty DLL a new super-power: Indirect syscalls So what I will be addressing here is: Indirect syscall: why and (mostly) references SSN enum and PIC challenges 1 tb of MASM Disclaimer I write code and implement techniques for research and learning purposes only. | |
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cocomelonc.github.io
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