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negativesign.com | ||
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www.eliza-ng.me
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| | | | | Introduction: Cryptography, the art of secure communication, relies on robust and trustworthy encryption algorithms to safeguard sensitive information. However, concerns about a potential backdoor in the NIST-approved Dual_EC_DRBG random number generator have plagued the encryption community for years. This article examines the history, suspicions, and implications surrounding the controversial algorithm. Background: Dual_EC_DRBG, based on elliptic curve cryptography, was included in NIST's SP 800-90A publication as one of the recommended random number generators for use in cryptography. However, from the beginning, doubts were raised about the algorithm's security and potential weaknesses. Later, it was publicly revealed that the United States National Security Agency (NSA) had likely inserted a kleptographic backdoor into the algorithm, further fueling concerns. | |
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www.johndcook.com
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| | | | | Random number generator test services. We test RNGs using the standard test suites: PractRand, TestU01 (BigCrush), DIEHARD(ER), NIST SP 800-22. | |
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blog.cryptographyengineering.com
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| | | | | In today's news of the weird, RSA (a division of EMC) hasrecommendedthat developers desist fromusingthe (allegedly) 'backdoored' Dual_EC_DRBG random number generator -- which happens to be thedefault in RSA's BSafe cryptographic toolkit. Youch. In case you're missing the story here, Dual_EC_DRBG (which I wrote about yesterday) is the random number generator voted most likely to... | |
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hamvocke.com
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| | | Customize the look and feel of tmux | ||
