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jhftss.github.io | ||
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bradleyjkemp.dev
LaunchDaemon (or LaunchAgent) Hijacking is a MacOS privilege escalation and persistence technique. It involves abusing insecure file/folder permissions to replace legitimately installed, misconfigured LaunchDaemons with malicious code. I first spotted this issue affecting the OSQuery installer but went looking and found multiple other products with the same problem. This isn't a novel technique (it's briefly mentioned in T1543.004) but I was surprised to find it so rarely talked about. Example - Hijacking the OSQuery LaunchDaemon I've already disclosed this issue to the OSQuery team and they kindly let me use it as an example in this post. |
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theevilbit.github.io
TL;DR Link to heading On macOS Mojave Gatekeeper only verifies executables, which are run with the open command or the user double clicks. It won't verify files, that are executed through other means like, directly executing a binary ./myapp regardless of the quarantine attribute. If you can place a plist file inside LaunchAgents/LaunchDaemons, the command inside will also be executed. Prior to Catalina there is a way to trick users to drag & drop files in the LaunchAgents folder. On macOS Catalina lot has changed, the most notable one regarding gatekeeper is that it will verify files when executed via classic 'exec' methods. |
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blog.quarkslab.com
The following article explains how during a Purple Team engagement we were able to identify a vulnerability in Microsoft Teams on macOS allowing us to access a user's camera and microphone. |
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codeworkshop.net
[AI summary] The post shares a shell script and launchd configuration that automates daily Homebrew package updates with Growl notifications. |
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