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rcoh.me | ||
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blog.peterdonis.com
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| | | | | A Blog by Peter A. Donis | |
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blog.citp.princeton.edu
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| | | | | Over 9000 jurisdictions (counties and states) in the U.S. run elections with a variety of voting machines: optical scanners for paper ballots, and direct-recording "touchscreen" machines. Which ones of them can be hacked to make them cheat, to transfer votes from one candidate to another? The answer: all of them. An attacker with physical access [...] | |
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benlog.com
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| | | | | It's voting season! Which means everyone is asking questions like: wait, why can't I vote online? how hard can voting really be? shouldn't this all be open-source? isn't it just as easy to hack paper voting as electronic voting? is Russia hacking our voting machines? why do we even need voting machines when other countries... | |
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www.schneier.com
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| | | Interesting analysis: An Internet Voting System Fatally Flawed in Creative New Ways. Abstract: The recently published "MERGE" protocol is designed to be used in the prototype CAC-vote system. The voting kiosk and protocol transmit votes over the internet and then transmit voter-verifiable paper ballots through the mail. In the MERGE protocol, the votes transmitted over the internet are used to tabulate the results and determine the winners, but audits and recounts use the paper ballots that arrive in time. The enunciated motivation for the protocol is to allow (electronic) votes from overseas military voters to be included in preliminary results before a (paper) ballot is received from the voter. MERGE contains interesting ideas that are not inherently unsou... | ||
