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paragonie.com | ||
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hannes.robur.coop
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| | | | | [AI summary] This article discusses updates to cryptographic libraries in OCaml and MirageOS, focusing on elliptic curve cryptography support through the fiat-crypto project, including new features like ECDSA/EdDSA, TLS 1.3 compatibility, and improved X.509 certificate handling. | |
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jonasnick.github.io
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| | | | | Abstract: MuSig is a multi-signature scheme for Schnorr signatures, which supports key aggregation and is secure in the plain public key model. ... | |
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www.openzeppelin.com
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| | | | | OpenZeppelin has assembled a team of ZKP experts, delivering security audits to top-tier projects including ZK-Sync, Scorll, and Linea over the past 2 years. Based on these valuable collaborations, OpenZeppelin is now officially launching the ZKP practice with a range of top-tier services aimed at innovative projects building and operating the top ZKP systems in the world. | |
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myers.io
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| | | Every so often I see posts on Stack Exchange, or Hacker News where someone has figured out that their passwords are being sent to the server and the server can see them! The logic that we see is that if the password is hashed client side, then only the hash needs to be sent to the server, so the server never knows the password. Unfortunately, I sometimes even see this go one step further when people suggest that with this arrangement, HTTPS isnt required. Wrong. | ||
